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Abstract 
The purpose of this article is to analyze how market power may affect the allocation of 
production between seasons (summer and winter) in a hydro power system with reservoir 
constraints and inflow uncertainty. We find that even without market power the price in the 
summer season may be lower than the expected price in the winter season. Market power may 
in some situations lead to higher sales and lower price in summer than the competitive 
outcome and in other situations to the opposite result. Furthermore, market power may lead to 
a smaller price difference between summer and winter than in a competitive market.  
                                                          
1
 This is a substantially revised version of an earlier draft with the title „Water with power: Market power and 
supply shortage in dry years‟. We are indebted to seminar participants at Norwegian School of Economics and 
Business Administration for helpful comments, and to the Research Council of Norway for funding through the 
project „Improving competition policy‟ at SNF. This paper presents our personal views, and it is not necessarily 
shared by the Norwegian Competition Authority. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In some countries electricity production is dominated by hydro power.
2
 A system where water 
can be stored in reservoirs and there is uncertainty about the inflow is quite complex. A large 
fill in one period may lead to overflow in the next if there is heavy rain. We are concerned 
with the consequences of market power in this setting.  How do we expect a producer with 
market power to behave?  A common argument is that a firm with market power could benefit 
from supplying much in one period thereby limiting its supply in the next period.  This 
conclusion finds support in the literature.
3
 We show that the opposite may be true, and 
furthermore that market power in a setting with uncertain inflow and a restricted reservoir 
may lead to smaller price differences between periods than what would be observed in a 
competitive outcome.  This seems to contrast with received wisdom.  
 
„In a perfectly competitive hydro system, demand peaks tend to be shaved off.. . 
Conversely, when hydro generators have market power the temporal separation is 
further increased.‟ (Rangel, 2008, p. 1296.) 
 
This study was motivated by observations in the Nordic power market 2002-03.  Spot prices 
in January 2003 were three to four times the average price in a normal year.
 4
 Producers 
blamed the price hike on the low inflow to reservoirs in autumn 2002. Data seems to support 
this claim.
 5
 Is this the whole story, or could it be that strategic behavior contributed to the 
price hike?  Victor D. Norman, the Minister responsible for competition policy, said the 
following at the outset of the period with supply shortage: 
 
„A situation with low prices during summer and high prices during winter may 
indicate that there has been an abuse of market power.‟ (Dagbladet, Nov. 13, 2002)  
 
Our problem relates to the medium term where uncertain inflow combined with restricted 
storage capacity is of importance.
6
  It corresponds to an analysis of transfer of water from a 
                                                          
2
 In New Zealand 60% of production is from hydro, in Chile 70%, Brazil 97% and Norway close to 100%. 
3
 See for example Crampes and Moreaux (2001), Garcia et al. (2001), Johnsen (2001), and Bushnell (2003). 
4
 It is of course inappropriate to infer from differences between ex post summer and winter prices that market 
power is abused. Such differences may entirely stem from stochastic events. The use of a theoretical model, 
however, may indicate under which conditions a firm has an incentive to exploit its market power.  
5
 For a discussion of the low inflow 2002/03, see Bye et al. (2003). During the winter 2009/10 spot prices 
repeatedly reached 20-40 times their normal level after a dry and cold autumn/winter, and high spot prices were 
also observed in the first part of the autumn/winter 2010/11 when we had low temperatures and low inflow.  
6
 Kelman et al. (2001) argue that uncertainty of inflow is a medium term and not a short term issue.  
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high-inflow period with low demand to a low-inflow period with high demand, i.e., in the 
Nordic countries summer and winter, where reservoirs are run down during winter and 
refilled when snow melts in spring and summer.  Summer is the first period of the model. 
Then available water from melting of snow is known.
 
 Rainfall during autumn is uncertain in 
summer.  If there is heavy rain, we assume that the inflow is so large that reservoirs become 
full and some water may have to be spilled. If there is little rain, however, we assume that the 
entire inflow will be stored for production in the succeeding winter season.
 7 
 
 
The basics of this economic problem are well known from other sectors and the literature.
8
 
Optimal capacity in a system with uncertain demand balances the expected loss from having 
too much to offer, i.e., having to waste the marginal unit, with the expected loss from carrying 
too little, i.e., having to forego sale of the marginal unit. Optimal allocation implies that 
sometimes there will be waste, which in our case is spill of water. In addition to this classical 
structure – which here translates into a restricted reservoir capacity and uncertain inflow of 
water – our demand for electricity is price dependent and there is market power. Our model 
can also be relevant for durable goods markets, where volumes sold in one period will 
influence the optimal price setting in the following periods. This shares some similarities with 
the interaction between periods that we have modeled. 
   
A producer may obviously profit if he is allowed to withhold supply and spill water. In that 
case, comparing operations of a price taker and a price maker provides an easy conclusion.
9
 
We will, however, adopt the seemingly common assumption in the analysis of hydro power 
systems that the regulator does not allow a producer to spill water for other reasons than 
overflow.
 10
 Unless there is overflow because of insufficient reservoir capacity, he has to 
supply all available water during the two periods.
11
 Thus our problem is essentially one of 
allocating a given total supply between two periods.  
 
                                                          
7
 Hydro reservoirs allow the system to smooth extreme variations in inflow over several years. By modeling only 
one year we disregard this possibility. We do not think this reduces the relevance of our results.    
8
 Cf. the classical Newsvendor problem. See any textbook in Operations Research.  
9
 The price maker will supply less and obtain a higher price. See figures 3.5 and 3.6 in Kelman et al. (2001). 
10
 See Crampes and Moreaux (2001), Johnsen (2001), Bushnell (2003), Skaar and Sørgard (2006), Førsund 
(2007), and Hansen (2009). 
11
 Of course, by his operations in period 1 the producer may provoke overflow and spill in period 2. This 
mechanism is incorporated into our model. 
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We show that when the probability for spill of water is positive, the expected winter price will 
be higher than the summer price even under perfect competition. Intuitively, if the summer 
price equaled expected winter price, a competitive firm would benefit from selling more 
during summer than to wait and risk a spill of water. The implication is that differences 
between summer prices and expected winter prices do not warrant a conclusion that there has 
been an abuse of market power.  
 
Our approach to the analysis uses the competitive outcome as the point of departure and 
checks whether a monopolist would deviate from this outcome. We derive simple formulas 
for when he would supply more (less) in period 1 than a competitive firm. It turns out that 
price elasticities measured at the competitive outcome in the two periods determine in which 
direction the monopolist would deviate from the competitive outcome. The general flavor is 
that for a given capacity, the monopolist will supply more than the competitive outcome in the 
period with the most elastic demand.   
 
The simplest case is when the reservoir capacity is so low that a high inflow leads to spill of 
water and the opportunity cost of water is zero. Then, only the marginal revenue in the low 
inflow state is relevant. The monopolist will now sell more than the price taker in period 1 if 
the price elasticity (at the competitive outcome) in period 1 is than larger in absolute value 
than the price elasticity in period 2 with low inflow. This is in line with standard theory where 
a monopolist reallocates sales from a market with low price elasticity to a market with a 
higher elasticity as this latter market can better sustain a larger volume. If he sells less during 
summer and more during winter, the price difference between summer and winter becomes 
smaller than in the competitive outcome. 
 
If demand is equal in the two periods, one might think that the monopolist has no incentive to 
deviate from the competitive outcome. This is correct when demand is described by a constant 
price elasticity function, but in general it is not true. When the price elasticity increases (in 
absolute value) with price, as for example with linear demand, the monopolist will supply less 
than the competitive outcome in period 1 because the competitive price (and thus the price 
elasticity) in period 1 is lower than the price (and price elasticity) in period 2 with low inflow. 
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If the reservoir capacity is sufficient and there is no spill, the price elasticities of demand can 
still be sufficient information to determine the direction of the distortion. For example, the 
monopolist will supply less (more) in period 1 if the price elasticity of demand in period 1 is 
lower (higher) than both price elasticities in period 2. If, however, the price elasticity of 
period 1 is between the elasticities of period 2, the formula is more complex, and also price 
levels and the probability of a high inflow matters.  
 
Reducing capacity marginally such that the solution shifts from being unconstrained to being 
constrained, the optimal response for the monopolist is typically to increase production in 
period 1 in order to avoid spill of water if there is a high inflow. However, demand for 
electricity is known to have low price elasticity and the constraint that all available water has 
to be used for production may result in negative marginal revenue in period 2 with high 
inflow. In that situation, the monopolist would reduce his supply in period 1 rather than 
increase it as a response to the reservoir constraint. Reduced supply in period 1 leads to a 
higher price in period 1. It allows a higher supply in period 2 when there is a low inflow and 
thus a reduction in the price that at the outset is too high in this state.  Now water in the high 
inflow state is spilled at zero cost, rather than sold at negative marginal revenue.  
 
Our results have implications for the question whether market power aggravates or not a 
supply shortage in periods with low inflow. According to the existing literature, market power 
leads to such distortion. We show that this is not always true. It depends on demand 
conditions during winter and summer, in particular the price elasticities of demand in the two 
periods. Unfortunately, to our knowledge there are no studies that test empirically the possible 
difference in price elasticities of demand between periods (summer and winter). 
 
Garcia et al. (2001) have also analysed a situation with water inflow and reservoir constraints, 
although in a very different model. For example, they assume an infinite horizon model with 
strategic interaction in a duopoly. They offer valuable insight into not only each producer‟s 
incentive to store water, but also the incentives for them to collude and the consequences of a 
price cap. They apply a rectangular demand function, where the price during winter time is 
exogenously given, and we complement their analysis by assuming a downward sloping 
demand curve. In our model a reallocation in sales between periods can lead to a change in 
prices. A shift in production from summer to winter would lead to higher summer prices and 
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lower winter prices, a mechanism not present in Garcia et al. (2001). This explains why we 
find that market power in some instances can shift production from summer to winter and in 
other instances lead to a reallocation the other way.  
 
Johnsen (2001) analyses market power, uncertain inflow, and storage in a two-period model 
with limited transmission capacity between two regions.
12
  He assumes that a producer can-
not dispose of water, but has to use all for production over the two periods.  He disregards 
reservoir capacity.  Compared to the competitive solution a monopolist increases production 
and stores less in the first period (when available water is certain) in order to become import 
constrained in the second period and thereby be able to create shortage and higher price.  Also 
by storing less, the monopolist reduces the probability of becoming export constrained in the 
second period if a high inflow should occur.   
 
Kelman et al. (2001), Bushnell (2003), and Evans et al. (2010) perform numerical analyses of 
hydrothermal competition in the electricity markets in Brazil, California and New Zealand 
respectively, allowing for market power and inflow uncertainty.  Evans et al. model 
continuous time, Bushnell studies periods within a time horizon of one month, while Kelman 
et al. studies months within a 3-year time horizon.  This time perspective of operations on a 
seasonal basis resembles ours.  While hydro production is almost the same in the monopoly 
and the competitive solutions both in Kelman et al and Evans et al., activity levels of thermal 
production are strikingly different.  Thus total supply is lower and prices are higher. Bushnell 
observes that a producer who exerts market power, but is not allowed to spill (dispose of) 
water may experience negative marginal value of water. (See BPA in Table 8.) 
 
This article is organized as follows. In the next section we formulate a theoretical model and 
report some general results. In Section 3 we provide some numerical examples to illustrate the 
complex interplay between the reservoir constraint and the functional form of the demand. In 
Section 4 we offer some concluding remarks. 
                                                          
12
 Hansen (2009) uses a two-period model of one region with uncertain inflow and compares the competitive 
outcome with both a monopoly and a Cournot outcome.  In his model there are no reservoir constraints and 
thereby no possibility for spill of water.  
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2. A theoretical model 
 
2.1 The model 
Our model has one region, two periods, uncertain inflow of water in the second period and a 
restricted reservoir capacity (R).
13
  The uncertainty is represented by two states of the world – 
a low (L) and a high (H) inflow of water in (the beginning of) the second period. We assume 
that capacity R is sufficient in the low inflow state, while it may be insufficient in the high 
inflow state. If so, there will be spill of water.  As mentioned above, if a producer can spill 
water in order to ration supply and drive up the price, the result is obvious:  A monopoly will 
supply less than the competitive outcome and prices will be higher. Cf. Kelman et al. (2001).  
We therefore assume that all available water has to be used for electricity production unless 
there is overflow. To focus on the medium term problem – which can be interpreted as one 
year - we also assume that all available water is used by the end of period 2; nothing is stored 
into the next year. Demand in each period depends on the price in this period (and state). Full 
use of available water may cause marginal revenues or even prices to become negative, to 
which we will return below. For the moment, however, we assume that prices and marginal 
revenues are non-negative. 
 
On the supply side we consider two regimes – monopoly and perfect competition.  While the 
monopoly is one firm – a price maker – the competitive market consists of many price taking 
firms and it is their aggregate volume (production and reservoir fill) that matters.  Expected 
profit (or revenue as we shall ignore costs other than the opportunity cost of water) of a firm 
(monopoly) producing from water is profit in period 1 plus expected profit from period 2: 
 
(1)    Eπ  =  p1 x1 + { q p2H x2H + (1-q) p2L x2L } 
        LLHH IrpqwIrqprIp 212212111 1  .  
 
x1 , p1(x1), and  I1 denote production, price, and inflow of period 1, x2s , p2s(x2s ), while I2s 
denote production, price, and inflow of period 2 state s, s = H, L.  rt denotes storage at the end 
of period t and q is the probability of a high inflow (I2H ). In state H, water may have to be 
spilled (w) such that the reservoir capacity (R) is not violated 
                                                          
13
 The model builds on Johnsen (2001) except that his model has restricted transmission between regions, while 
we focus on restricted storage capacity. 
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(2) RwIr H21  . 
 
The firm has two non-negative decision variables: r1 and w. The requirement that all water is 
used is embedded in the model structure as x2s, s = H, L, are not separate decision variables, 
but determined by supply in period 1 (x1) and possible spill (w).  
 
Both behavioral types want to maximize profits subject to the reservoir and non-negativity 
constraints. A price taker considers prices as given beyond his control while a monopoly 
realizes that it can influence prices.  In order to present both behavioral regimes on a compact 
form, let z = p for the price takers and z = MR (marginal revenue) for the price maker. 
Finally, let λ denote the shadow price on the reservoir capacity interpreted as marginal cost of 
capacity.  First order conditions for optimal operations are then
14
  
 
(3)  i)    0)1( 2211  LH zqqzzv  ,      ii) r1 > 0,   and   iii)  v1 r1 = 0,
15
 
(4) i)  022  Hqzv ,            ii) w > 0,   and   iii)  v2 w = 0, 
(5) i)  0)( 213  HIrwRv ,          ii) λ  > 0,   and   iii)  v3 λ = 0.
 16
 
 
Condition (3) is about optimal inventory management. (3i) says that in equilibrium the 
expected value (price or marginal revenue) from selling the marginal stored unit cannot 
exceed its marginal cost as determined by forgone sale in period 1 and marginal cost of 
storage. Furthermore, inventory has to be non-negative (3ii), and if it is positive, the expected 
value from sale in period 2 equals its marginal cost (3iii). That is, each firm will balance its 
storage fill (production) such that this obtains.
17
  Condition (4) is about spill of water in state 
                                                          
14
 (3)-(5) are equilibrium conditions for two models: The monopoly with one price maker and the competitive 
model with an aggregation of many price taking firms. See the Appendix. Formulating an equilibrium model 
directly antedates Samuelson (1952), who suggested the artificial objective of maximizing the sum of producers‟ 
and consumers‟ surpluses in order to obtain a computable model for the competitive equilibrium. The direct 
approach was again brought forward by Scarf‟s (1973) development of the fixed-point algorithm and received 
renewed interest. Mathiesen (1985) and Bushnell (2003), among others, employed this format.  
15
 qp2H and (1-q)p2L are Arrow-Debreu prices, where p2s is a price contingent on being in state s, s = H, L, and    
p2 ≡ (qp2H + (1-q)p2L) is the price of electricity in period 2 as evaluated in period 1. Mathiesen (1992) interpreted 
p2s as spot prices and p2 as a guaranteed price (irrespective of the outcome of inflow). 
16
 A complementary slackness condition vy = 0, implies that if y > 0, v = 0, and if v > 0, y = 0. In general, y = 0 
does not imply v > 0 and, v = 0, does not imply y > 0.  
17
 This interpretation (in terms of prices) is straight forward for the monopoly – it can influence prices. Each 
individual price taker cannot, but aggregate volumes adjust such that prices are balanced in equilibrium. 
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H and hence the reservoir capacity. The marginal value of capacity (λ) is constrained by the 
expected value of water in state H, i.e., the Arrow-Debreu price.  If there is spill, (4i) holds 
with equality, while if there is excess capacity the marginal value of capacity is zero.  
Condition (5i) is the reservoir constraint. (5ii) requires the shadow price of capacity to be non-
negative, and (5iii) says that when this shadow price is positive, capacity binds, and when 
there is slack capacity, the shadow price is zero.  We will return to further interpretations of 
these conditions below.  
 
Observe that although the model (3)-(5) is solved for both periods simultaneously, it includes 
the full set of contingent second stage variables (x2s), s = H, L, such that optimal choices are 
being made ex post the resolution of uncertainty. Thus the solution is of closed loop type. 
 
Because we focus on the implications of restricted storage capacity, i.e., a full rather than an 
empty storage, we assume that r1 = I1 - x1 > 0, whereby (3iii) implies 
  
(3i‟)    2221 1 zEzqqzz LH  . 
 
2.2 Intuition about the solutions 
We want to characterize optimal water allocations for different levels of reservoir capacity 
treating R as a parameter. The model is phrased in terms of storage (r1), but we find it more 
convenient to discuss its solutions in terms of production in period 1 (x1 = I1 - r1). Production 
will be in either of three regimes as illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Optimal production x1 as a function of reservoir capacity R 
R
Regime 3             Regime 2                           Regime 1
w > 0 w = 0
λ > 0 λ > 0
X1
R'R"
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If reservoir capacity is sufficiently large (R > R’), the producer can choose the unconstrained 
production in period 1. That is, x1 is independent of R (dx1/dR = 0), which is illustrated in the 
right part of Figure 1. This solution is labeled Regime 1. 
 
For a reservoir capacity below R’, choosing the unconstrained production in period 1 would 
lead to spill of water in state H in period 2. Spill implies a loss of revenue compared to the 
unconstrained solution. For a medium reservoir capacity, with R” < R < R‟, it is better to 
increase production in period 1 and thereby reduce the amount of water stored. This is in 
Figure 1 labeled Regime 2, where the shadow price (λ) is positive because of the lost revenue 
from reallocating sales, but where there is no spill of water (w = 0). Reduced reservoir 
capacity is matched by a corresponding increase in production in period 1 (dx1/dR = -1).  
  
For a low reservoir capacity, illustrated in Figure 1 with R < R‟‟, the production in period 1 
would have to be substantially higher than the unconstrained solution in order to avoid spill of 
water. The costs associated with such distorted sales at a very low price in period 1, are so 
large that the firm would be better off choosing a production in period 1 that leads to spill of 
water in state H. This is labeled Regime 3, where there is a positive shadow price on the 
reservoir capacity (λ > 0) and spill of water (w > 0). In this regime a further reduction in 
reservoir capacity will have no effect on the level of production in period 1 (dx1/dR = 0), but 
only lead to increased spill of water if there is a high inflow (dw/dR = - 1). 
 
2.3 Definition of Regimes 
Let ki1x  denote the optimal production level in period 1, where i = M, C for monopoly and 
competition respectively, and k = 1, 2, 3 for the regimes. In period 2 the optimal production 
levels are denoted kisx2 , where s = L, H. Optimal prices are defined similarly. 
 
Regime 1 [High reservoir capacity]: 
When reservoir capacity is sufficient, i.e., wxIIR 1H21  ,  (5iii) implies that  λ = 0. 
From (3i‟) we have the price condition (or first-order condition for optimal x1) 
 
(6)  21 zEz  . 
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The price taker allocates water between periods such that the price he obtains in period 1 
equals the expected price of period 2,
18
 while the monopoly similarly balances marginal 
revenues.
19
 This leads to optimal production levels C1
1
x  respectively M11x  in period 1.  
 
When the reservoir capacity becomes scarce (2) may be rewritten as  
 
 (2‟) x1 + w = (I1 + I2H) – R. 
 
To balance the storage of water one can either increase x1 beyond 
i1
1
x  (reduce storage (r1)) 
(Regime 2), or aim for spill of water in state H, w > 0 (Regime 3). 
 
Regime 2 [Medium reservoir capacity]: 
Increased x1 means increased supply in period 1 and reduced supply in period 2. When pt(x), t 
= 1, 2, is decreasing and strictly monotone, increased x1 implies lower price in period 1 
[p1(x1) < p1(
C1
1x )] and higher average price in period 2 [E(p2) > E(
C
sp
1
2
)]. The same argument 
applies to the monopoly when MRt(x),  t = 1, 2, is decreasing and strictly monotone.  When x1 
> i11x , it therefore follows from (3i) that 
 
(7)   12 zzE   > 0. 
 
 λ now measures the expected loss of (marginal) revenue from reallocating supply from period 
2 to period 1.  Thus, when R constrains production, λ > 0 and thereby 
  
(6‟)         21 zEz  . 
 
Intuitively, it is more profitable to sell a unit at a positive price (marginal revenue) in period 1 
than possibly have to spill it in period 2 although the price (marginal revenue) in period 1 is 
below the expected price (marginal revenue) in period 2.  
 
Regime 3 [Low reservoir capacity]: 
                                                          
18
 This does not say that the individual price taker tries to control prices, but that in a competitive equilibrium 
prices satisfy this condition because of aggregate adjustments by the firms. 
19
 The analysis in this regime is analogous to the analyses in Johnsen (2001) and Hansen (2009). 
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If the producer spills water (w > 0), (4i) and (4iii) imply that λ = Hqz2 , and (3i‟) simplifies to 
 (6”)           Lzqz 21 1 . 
 
The price (marginal revenue) obtained in state H is irrelevant to the pricing condition because 
the marginal, stored unit is spilled.  
 
When expected profits are concave in r1 and w, and inflows I1, I2H , I2L, and capacity R are 
positive the model has a unique solution for both types. (See Lemma 1 in the Appendix.) 
Depending on the particular parameter values this solution may be in Regime 1, 2, or 3.  
 
2.4 Results concerning allocation of production 
Our goal is to describe possible consequences of market power. Taking the competitive 
outcome as a reference we ask whether a monopoly has an incentive to deviate from this 
solution.
20
  Consider the competitive outcome with optimal production and measure price 
elasticities of demand at these volumes. Let 
1 , H2 and, L2  denote the elasticities in period 
1, in period 2 state H and state L, respectively. 
 
While the solution for both behavioral types will be in any of the three regimes illustrated in 
Figure 1, they may be in the same regime (for a given R) or they may be in different regimes. 
Assume first both solutions are in the same regime.  
 
Proposition 1: Solutions in the same regime. 
Assume that pt(x) > 0 and MRt(x) > 0, t = 1, 2, for all relevant x.  Then 
(i) In Regime 1 [high reservoir capacity], M11x > 
C1
1x  if  
 1  < s2  , s = H, L    (sufficient condition) 
 
q
q1
p
p
11
11
H2
L2
1L2
H21 



      (necessary and sufficient condition). 
(ii) In Regime 2 [medium reservoir capacity], M21x = 
C2
1x . 
(iii) In Regime 3 [low reservoir capacity], M31x > 
C3
1x  if  1  < L2 . 
                                                          
20
 Farrell and Shapiro (1990, 2010) used this approach to check whether a merged entity would find it profitable 
to deviate from the prices set by the merger candidates prior to the merger. 
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Proof. See the Appendix. 
 
In Regimes 1 and 3, supply differs for the two behavioral types when price elasticities differ 
between periods. The monopolist will supply more than the competitive outcome in the period 
where demand is most elastic.  
 
A monopoly will set price in accordance with the inverse price elasticity rule. Thus, the 
Proposition shows that differences in (inverse) price elasticities are decisive for whether and 
how a monopoly will deviate from the competitive outcome. In Regime 3 the trade off is 
between demand in period 1 and demand in state L of period 2. With identical elasticities, the 
monopoly has no incentive to charge other prices than the competitive outcome. If elasticities 
differ, however, the monopoly would profit from increasing its supply when demand is most 
elastic.  
 
In Regime 1, with high reservoir capacity, three prices are involved and the rule is more 
complicated. One trivial case is when demand in period 1 is more elastic than demand in both 
states of period 2. Then the monopoly would produce more than the competitive outcome in 
period 1. The opposite case is also trivial. If demand in period 1 is less elastic than demand in 
both states of period 2, the monopoly would supply more than the competitive outcome in 
period 2. The more complex case is when the price elasticity of demand in period 1 lies 
between the two elasticities of period 2, L2  < 1  < H2 .
21
 Then, a higher monopoly supply 
than the competitive outcome in period 1 and thereby a lower supply in period 2 is more 
likely (i) the lower the probability of high inflow (q) and (ii) the lower the price with low 
inflow ( L2p ).  
 
Proposition 1 applies to situations where both firms‟ solution are in the same regime. But this 
may not be the case. For example, the monopoly may spill water (Regime 3) while the 
competitive firm has a higher production (Regime 2).  
 
                                                          
21
 For example, when demand is linear the price elasticity increases in magnitude with price. Being a negative 
number, it is lower at the high price of a low inflow (supply). Thus, 
L2  <  H2 . 
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Figure 2 illustrates how the two firms‟ solution can be in different regimes.  Consider the left 
panel where demand in period 1 is most elastic. When both firms are in the same regime, i.e., 
R > 'CR , 
''
CR  < R < 
'
MR , or R <
''
MR , the graphs illustrate Proposition 1. Within Regimes 1 
and 3 the monopoly produces more than the competitive outcome in period 1, while their 
production is equal in Regime 2. With unequal demand in the two periods the breakpoints  
 
  
 
Figure 2: Optimal x1 as function of reservoir capacity (R) with constant price elasticity. 
(a) Most elastic demand in period 1.  (b) Most elastic demand in period 2. 
between the regimes may differ for the two types. Hence, there is an interval ( 'MR < R < 
'
CR ) 
where the monopoly solution is in Regime 1, while the competitive solution is in Regime 2 
and similarly at the other end, the competitive solution gets into Regime 3 (at ''CR ) before the 
monopoly solution (at ''MR ).  In the right panel demand is most elastic in period 2 and the 
graphs are switched. Figure 3 below illustrates the possibility that there may be no overlap 
between regimes. 
 
We can summarize these observations as follows: 
Proposition 2:  
Assume that pt(x) > 0 and MRt(x) > 0, t = 1, 2, for all relevant x.   
Then kMx1 > 
kCx1 , k = 1, 2, 3   if 1 < 
L
2 .  
 
We have assumed positive price and marginal revenue. For some demand functions both may 
be negative for “large” volumes. For example, with a linear demand function p = a + bx, 
x1
RR'CR'MR"M R"C
Monopoly
Price-taker
x1
RR'MR'CR"C R"M
Monopoly
Price-taker
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price is negative for x > X = -a/b, and the marginal revenue is negative for x > X/2.
22
  We will 
maintain the assumption of a positive price, but consider negative marginal revenue.
23
 The 
critical issue is marginal revenue in period 2 state H when R = R’, i.e., at the breakpoint 
between Regimes 1 and 2. If  'RMRH2  < 0, (3i‟) implies MR1 > E(MR2), which would signal 
that reallocation from period 2 to period 1 is constrained, i.e., r1 = 0. However, we have 
assumed that r1 = I1 – x1 > 0 because of our focus is on the spill of water, not an empty 
reservoir. Thus, increasing x1 (as in Regime 2) is inconsistent with optimality when  'RMRH2  
< 0 and r1 > 0.  In fact, Regime 2 does not appear when  'RMRH2  < 0.  
 
Proposition 3:  
Assume  '2 RMR H  < 0. Then Regime 2 is no longer present and monopoly production in 
Regime 3[low reservoir capacity] is lower than in Regime 1 [high reservoir capacity], i.e., 
M3
1x < 
M1
1x . 
 
Proof. See the appendix. 
 
Negative marginal revenue means that (compared to demand) there is too much water 
available in state H of period 2. If the reservoir does not constrain water allocation, the 
monopoly dampens this problem by supplying more in period 1 and thereby less in period 2. 
However, this drives down the price in period 1. If the reservoir constrains allocation, supply 
in period 2 with high inflow is separated from supply in period 1. Then there is no reason to 
distort production in period 1 and the monopolist can respond to a reservoir constraint by 
supplying less in period 1. Figure 4 (below) illustrates the monopoly‟s optimal production x1 
as a function of R when 0)'(2 RMR H . 
 
2.5 Results concerning price differences 
Finally, consider price differences between periods. It is of interest to see whether a shift from 
a competitive to a monopoly outcome will lead to larger or smaller price differences. Let us 
                                                          
22
 Bushnell reports that his hydrothermal model of the Western United States computes negative values of water 
for BPA when the firm exerts market power. (Bushnell, 2003, p 90 and Table 8.) 
23
 The results derived below for negative marginal revenues in the monopoly solution apply equally well to the 
case of a negative price and the competitive equilibrium. In practical application, however, it is easier to envision 
sales at negative marginal revenue than at a negative price. 
SNF Working Paper No 03/2011 
 
16 
define price difference as the difference between average prices in the two periods. Again we 
assume that 0)'(2 RMR H . 
 
From our analysis, we have the following results: 
 
Proposition 4: 
(i) Regime 1 [high reservoir capacity]: p1 = E(p2) in the competitive outcome. 
(ii) Regimes 2 and 3 [low/medium reservoir capacity]:  p1 < E(p2) in the competitive 
outcome. 
(iii) In Regime 1, if M11x ≠ 
C1
1x , a shift from the competitive to the monopoly outcome 
increases the difference in average prices in the two periods. 
(iv) In Regime 3, if M31x < 
C3
1x , a shift from the competitive to the monopoly outcome 
decreases the difference in the average prices in the two periods  
 
Proof: See the appendix.    
 
If the reservoir does not constrain water allocation, the competitive outcome leads to equal 
average prices in the two periods. If the reservoir constraint is binding, however, production 
in period 1 is increased in order to avoid spill of water completely (Regime 2) or partly 
(Regime 3) and the price in period 1 is below the average price of period 2.  
 
With a non-binding reservoir (Regime 1) average prices in the competitive outcome are equal. 
Any other water allocation leads to price differences. This is in line with what we expect in 
markets with market power.  In Regime 3, there are differences in average prices even in the 
competitive outcome and market power can lead to either larger or smaller differences. If the 
monopoly produces less than the competitive outcome in period 1, the price difference is 
reduced.  In particular the monopoly price in period 2 state L will be lower than the 
competitive price.  Interestingly, in this case the difference between the highest and lowest 
price in the two periods is larger in the competitive outcome than in a situation with market 
power.  Cf. Rangel (2008) who seems to suggest the opposite. 
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3. Numerical examples 
 
In the literature it has been shown that the choice of demand function affects the magnitude of 
a price increase in a merger simulation.
24
 Although we are only interested in qualitative 
results, i.e., whether the monopoly will supply more (or less) than the competitive outcome, 
functional form also affect our results. For illustrations we apply the function  
 
 p = a + bx
e
. 
 
Two parameter sets give rise to often used demand functions:  
 a = 0, b > 0 and e < 0, which gives demand with constant price elasticity (ε=1/e), and  
 a > 0, b < 0 and 0 < e < 2, which is a convex (e < 1), a linear (e=1), or a concave (e > 1) 
function. 
 
(i) Demand with constant price elasticity. 
Assume that that demand has constant price elasticity (ε). Inverse demand is p = bxe, where e 
= 1/ε, and MR = (e+1)p. MR > 0 when (e+1) > 0, i.e., 1/ε > -1 or ε < -1, which is required for 
existence of a profit maximum for the monopoly. For this demand function we can conclude 
that MR > 0 (and p > 0) in all periods and states of the world. Thus, λ > 0 and our pricing 
conditions (6), (6‟), and (6”) all apply.  
 
When demand is equally elastic in the two periods, optimal allocation of water is identical for 
the two types. In fact, (6) and (6”) reduce to identical conditions for the two types with this 
function. This follows directly from Proposition 1, and Figure 1 illustrates this case.
25
 
 
Unequal demand is obtained by increasing either of the two parameters b and e in a period. 
Note that b captures the market size, while e captures the (inverse) price elasticity. Different 
b‟s make no difference to the comparison of production volumes from conditions (6) and (6“) 
for the two types. This follows directly as the price elasticity does not change along this 
demand curve (see Proposition 1). Changing e (the inverse elasticity), however, has the effect 
                                                          
24
 Crooke et al. (1999) have shown that the predicted price increase from a merger is much larger when using an 
iso-elastic rather than a linear demand curve. 
25
 Demand is calibrated to P=10, X=10, and ε = -2, giving e = -0.5 and b =31.62. I1 =16, I2
H
 =6, I2
L
 =2, and q = 
½.  
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that the optimal allocation of water will differ for the two behavioral types. Figure 2 illustrates 
two cases. In 2a demand is most elastic in period 1 (ε1 < ε2 < -1) which implies  
-1 < e2 < e1 < 0, while in 2b demand is least elastic in period 1 so that -1 < e1 < e2 < 0.  
  
(ii) Linear demand (a > 0, b < 0, and e = 1) 
Let  p = a + bx. Although p < 0 for x > -a/b, we consider only supply (x) such that that p(x) > 
0. We will, however, study supply x for which MR(x) = a + 2bx < 0, that is, x > -a/2b. As 
shown above the sign of 
HMR2  matters at the point where reservoir capacity becomes 
binding. We therefore distinguish between cases where marginal revenue is positive and 
negative, and start with parameters a and b such that )'(2 RMR H  > 0. We consider changes in 
parameter a, which captures the willingness to pay. An increase in a leads to a parallel 
upwards shift in the demand curve. 
 
Positive marginal revenue at R’ 
Consider three parameter sets: i) a1 = a2 , ii) a1 > a2, and iii) a1 < a2. Figure 3 displays optimal 
production (x1) for the two behavioral types for different reservoir capacities. The patterns of 
these graphs are similar to those of the examples with constant price elasticity in Figure 2. 
Going right to left, first there is a segment with constant production, then a segment where 
production is increased in order to avoid spill, and finally a segment where production again 
is held constant while water is spilled in state H. 
 
The graphs in the panel with a1 = a2 coincide in Regimes 1 and 2, while they deviate in 
Regime 3, with a lower monopoly production. Observe that Proposition 1 relates to price 
elasticities measured at the competitive equilibrium. Demand with constant price elasticity 
has by definition the same elasticity throughout. This is not the case for the linear demand 
function where the price elasticity increases with price. In particular, the price elasticity of 
demand is higher in period 2 with low inflow than in period 1 since quantity sold is higher in 
the latter case. Hence, the different pictures of Regime 3 in Figures 2 and 3 follow because of 
non-constant price elasticity along the linear demand in Figure 3.
26
  
 
                                                          
26
 The elasticities computed at the solution C1x are ε1 = -2.3, ε2H = -1.7, and ε2L = -3.3, whereby MR1 = E(MR2). 
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Consider the panels with a1 ≠ a2.
27
 The Regime 1 segment of the graphs looks like those in 
Figure 2.  When a1 > a2, elasticities at the competitive outcome 
C
1x satisfy ε1 > ε2
s
, s = H, L, 
i.e., demand is most elastic in period 2.
28
 Then it follows from Proposition 2 that C1x  > 
M
1x . 
Observe that the graphs of the two types are disjoint, i.e., there is no overlap of Regime 2.
29
   
 
The Regime 3 segments differ from the picture in Figure 2 as C1x  > 
M
1x in both panels. In 
Regime 3 it is a1 versus (1-q)a2 that matters, not a1 versus a2 (see Lemma 2).  
 
Figure 3. Optimal production (x1) with linear demand.  
  
 
 
 
Negative marginal revenue at R’ 
A monopoly would never supply such that MR is negative if it could restrict supply. We have 
assumed, however, that the producer is not allowed to spill water for other reasons than 
overflow (in state H). He has to supply all available water (as electricity) during the two 
                                                          
27
 In the base case (with a1=a2) linear demand is calibrated at P1 = P2 = 10,  X1= X2 = 10, with a price elasticity  
ε = -2 at this point. Recalibrating demand at prices P1 = 10 + ΔP and P2 = 10 - ΔP, gives solutions C1x = 10 + 2ΔP 
and M
1
x  = 10 + ½ΔP in Regime 1.  
28
 Elasticities at the competitive solution x1
C
 = 14 are ε1 = -1.14   ε2
L
 = -6.5 , ε2
H
 = -2.75. 
29
 With a fixed volume to be shared over two periods the consumers‟ surplus (CS) becomes convex in volume 
and is maximized at a corner solution. Consider x1+x2=1, Pt=1- xt, t=1,2. CS is maximized at x1=1, x2=0, or at 
x1=0, x2=1, and not at x1= x2=½. The objective for the competitive outcome, the sum of consumers‟ and 
producers‟ surpluses, is concave however, and the competitive outcome is not at a corner solution, but it is more 
sensitive to parameter changes than the monopoly outcome. 
9
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periods. Thus the monopoly may have to supply at negative marginal revenue. Our model is 
constructed such that this may happen in period 2 state H. Assume that  '2 RMR H  < 0. 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the optimal production for the two behavioral types for four sets of 
parameter values: i) a1 = a2, ii) a1 > a2, iii) a1 < a2, and iv) a1 < (1-q)a2. 
 
The pattern of optimal production in Regime 1 is as above. Solutions coincide when demand 
is equal, C1x  > 
M
1x  when a1 > a2, and 
C
1x  < 
M
1x when a1 < a2. Furthermore, the graph for the 
price-taker consists of three segments as above. The striking difference is the pattern of 
monopoly production outside Regime 1. As commented upon above, this is related to H2MR
being negative at the point where R becomes binding. We have shown that in this case the 
middle, upward-sloping segment of a production plan is never optimal. The monopoly 
bypasses this segment, jumping from constant, unconstrained production to constant 
constrained production with spill of water, and we observe that monopoly production is 
reduced going from Regime 1 to Regime 3 (see Proposition 3).           
 
Figure 4. Optimal production (x1) with linear demand when MR2
H(R’) < 0. 
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C
1x  > 
M
1x in the first three panels in Regime 3. Lemma 2 tells us that this is true when  
a1 > (1-q)a2. With a1 < (1-q)a2, however, 
C
1x  < 
M
1x , as shown in the fourth panel. 
 
4. Some concluding remarks 
Hydro power systems are complex partly because of reservoirs that allow reallocation of 
water between periods.  Our analysis is not about whether total production is changed, but 
rather whether and how production is reallocated between periods.  We present simple 
formulas to predict the direction of the distortion caused by market power.  Information about 
the price elasticities of demand can be sufficient to determine whether market power will lead 
to higher (or lower) production in the first period.  This suggests that information about price 
elasticities of demand, for example differences between summer and winter, is crucial for 
understanding the consequences of a merger that would have a potential for exploiting market 
power. 
 
Our analysis illustrates that market power as such will not necessarily lead to a more serious 
supply shortage in situations with a low inflow of water. To the contrary, a monopoly may 
find it profitable to produce less in period 1 and thereby more in period 2 state L. On the other 
hand, the lower production in period 1 that provides a basis for higher production in period 2, 
also increases availability in state H and will cause spill of water in this state. Thus, the 
example illustrates that the benefit from having more water available in case of low inflow is 
balanced with the drawback of a higher spill of water when there is high inflow.  
 
It is misguided, however, to focus on whether market power leads to a more serious supply 
shortage if there is low inflow.  The competitive outcome is the social optimum balancing the 
marginal value to society of production in period 1 and the marginal value of storing one unit 
for supply in period 2.  Any deviation from that outcome creates a distortion.  By definition 
then, exertion of market power will most likely lead to a distortion irrespective of the 
direction of the distortion.  
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Appendix.  
 
Lemma 1.  Assume that expected profits are concave in r1 and w, and that parameters I1, I2L, 
and I2H are positive. For a given R > 0, the model (1)-(2) has a unique solution for both 
behavioral types. Depending on R, this solution may be in Regimes 1 or 3, or when price 
(marginal profit) is positive at R’, in Regime 2. 
 
Proof. It is an established fact that the maximization of a concave function over a non-empty 
and convex set has a unique solution. We have assumed that both objectives are concave in 
decision variables. The constraint set is defined by linear constraints. Hence it is convex. 
When I1, I2L, I2H, and R are all positive, the constraint set is non-empty.  
 
Proof of Proposition 1.  
Regime 1: From (8) we write the optimality condition for the competitive outcome as  
(C)       LH pqqpp 221 1 ,  and the optimality condition for the monopoly as  
(M)   MR1 =   L
L
H
H
pqpqp 2
2
2
21
1
1
11
1
1
1
1 



















 = E(MR2). 
The monopolist has an incentive to set M11x > 
C1
1x  when MR1 > E(MR2), as measured at the 
competitive outcome.  When ε1 < ε2s < -1, it follows that (1+1/ε1) > (1+1/ε2s), s = L, H, 
whereby MR1 > E(MR2), which proves the first bullet-point.  
Use (C) to substitute for p1 in (M) and we get that 
M1
1x > 
C1
1x if 
(E)   L2
1L2
H2
H21
p
11
q1p
11
q



















.   
(E) is easily rearranged as the condition in Proposition 1 and proves the second bullet point. 
 
Regime 2: For any given reservoir capacity R, there is a unique production in period 1 that 
leads to no spill of water and full capacity utilization if there is high inflow. If both producers‟ 
solutions are in Regime 2, these solutions have to be identical.  
 
Regime 3: From (8‟‟) the first order condition in the competitive outcome is 
(C‟)     L21 pq1p   , while the first order condition for the monopolist is  
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(M‟)  MR1 =   L2L
21
1 p
1
1q1
1
1p
















 = E(MR2). 
Again, the monopolist will set M11x > 
C1
1x  when MR1 > E(MR2). Now, use (C‟) to substitute 
for p1 in (M‟) to get that M11x > 
C1
1x if  (1+1/ε1) > (1+1/ε2L) or ε1 < ε2L. 
 
Proof  of Proposition 3.  
Assume that x1
1
 solves (8), i.e., MR1 = (1-q)MR2
L
 + qMR2
H
, and that MR2
H
(x1
1
) < 0. Thus, 
MR1(x1
1
) < (1-q)MR2
L
(x1
1
). Observe that MR1 decreases in x1 while MR2
L
 increases in x1 
(decreases in x2
L
). The x1-value x1
3
 that solves (8”) (in Regime 3), i.e., MR1 = (1-q)MR2
L
, is 
therefore smaller than x1
1
, i.e.,  x1
3
 < x1
1
. 
 
Lemma 3. Let inverse demand p(x) = a + bx
e
, and consider Regime 3.  
If a1 = (1-q)a2 and e1 < e2, x1
C
 < x1
M
, while if a1 > (1-q)a2 and e1 = e2, x1
C
 > x1
M
. 
 
Proof. 
(8”) for the competitive case can be rewritten as  
(C‟) b1x1
e1
 – (1-q)b2(x2
L
)
e2
 = (1-q)a2 – a1  
and for the monopoly (8”) can be written as 
(M‟) (1+e1)b1x1
e1
 – (1-q)(1+e2)b2(x2
L
)
e2
 = (1-q)a2 – a1 . 
 
If a1 = (1-q)a2 the conditions can be rewritten as g(x1) = B, with g(x1) = x1
e1
/(x2
L
)
e2
 and equal 
for the two cases, while constant B differs, BC = (1-q)b2/b1 and BM = BC[(1+e2)/(1+e1)]. With  
e1 < e2, it follows that BC < BM and as g is increasing in x1, x1
C
 < x1
M
. 
 
If a1 > (1-q)a2, the conditions can be written as h(x1) = B with hC ≡ x1
e1
 – [(1-q)b2/b1](x2
L
)
e2
 
and hM ≡ x1
e1
 – [(1-q)b2(1+e2)/b1(1+e1)](x2
L
)
e2
 and with constants BC = [(1- q)a2 - a1] /b1 > 0 
and  
BM = BC /(1+e1) > 0. If e1 = e2, hC = hM and increasing, and BC > BM, whereby x1
C
 > x1
M
. 
